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This paper describes the evolution of intergovernmental relationships on debt 
rescheduling. It starts describing some experiences that aroused in the 18
th Century and 
which negotiations were carried out, in many occasions, with the help of gunboat 
diplomacy. The settlement of liabilities that were created at the aftermath of the two 
20
th Century World Wars, which were – at least for some countries –- not exactly debt but 
war reparations, gave some insights in how to deal with these problems allowing the 
debtor country to find its own path to get out of the debt overhang. The settlement of 
these foreign liabilities may give some guidelines for dealing with debt restructuring in 
more general cases The creation of the Paris Club – which is a very civilized way to 
settle debt defaults compared to gunboat diplomacy – is analyzed and described here: 
first its emergency as an ad hoc transitory institution and later its evolution toward its 
definitive establishment in the international financial system landscape. It is also 
suggested that for a combination of events, which included the launch in Evian of the G-8’s 
so-called Evian Approach for the Paris Club, as well as the lack of support of some 
major industrialized countries to the implementation of a Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Mechanism (SDRM), the Paris Club has become the only feasible international 
intergovernmental debt restructuring mechanism in spite of numerous shortcomings 
embodied in it. On this basis, some improvements of the actual mechanism are proposed, 





Today, when the world’s major government creditors seek to address the difficulties that 
individual governments of developing countries or economies in transition have in meeting 
their debt-servicing obligations to them, they usually work through the Paris Club. It is an 
informal forum, serviced by the French Treasury, at which the major creditors agree to take a 
common approach to restructuring the repayment schedules on each of the individual loans 
owed to each of the member countries’ government agencies or offices, or sometimes they 
agree to reduce the amount of outstanding debt itself. 
However, there are problems in this mechanism. Not all creditor governments are members of 
the Paris Club. It also excludes consideration of debts owed to the multilateral institutions, to 
commercial banks and other private creditors. Moreover, debtor countries express genuine 
concern about the effectiveness and lack of impartiality of the Paris Club, the heavy cost in 
terms of the time consumed in individual negotiations with many creditors, and the fact that   2 
creditors can also apply pressure in bilateral reschedulings. Nevertheless, the Paris Club 
serves as the only specialized intergovernmental forum for debt restructuring of countries in 
debt crisis. 
The major governments created the Paris Club in the 1950s at a time, which was marked by 
the post World War II environment, when most international lending was undertaken by or 
guaranteed by creditor governments or by official multilateral institutions. The International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) has played a central policy and financial oversight role in this structure, 
as well as major provider of additional financing, often coupled with new loans from the 
World Bank and regional development banks. IMF calculates the overall financing gap that 
debt relief needs to cover and the Paris Club establishes how to apportion among its member 
countries the relief it agrees to give. While informal, this is the first creditor-coordinated 
attempt to establish a comprehensive international framework for sovereign debt 
restructuring. Various ad hoc and selective measures had been used previously, including 
“gunboat diplomacy” in the nineteenth century. Compared to that, the Paris Club is a very 
civilized procedure! 
As large-scale private lending resumed in the 1970s, Paris Club centrality could not last, 
although the Club has remained a crucial institution for those countries still heavily indebted 
to official bilateral creditors. However, with the introduction of the “Evian Approach” in 
2003, the major creditor governments have sought to bring the Paris Club back towards the 
centre of international responsibility for sovereign debt workouts, including pressing for 
comparability of treatment by the private sector creditors.  
This paper examines the emergence of the Paris Club and how its approach to debt workouts 
has evolved over time. It begins with a discussion of how sovereign debt crises were resolved 
beforehand and ends with recommendations to address certain outstanding issues involving 
the Paris Club in the twenty-first century.  
II. THE EARLY DAYS OF SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING 
Governments have raised funds by borrowing throughout history. Default on those obligations 
is also an ancient practice.
1 Mostly, the creditors were not other governments, although the 
governments of the creditors sometimes helped collect the debts for them. In particular, 
during the 19
th and early 20
th centuries, ad hoc associations of private holders of foreign 
government bonds customarily formed themselves for negotiating with debtor governments 
when payment difficulties arose. Occasionally the bondholders’ governments assisted, even 
employing “gunboat diplomacy” to enforce compliance with contractual obligations. The 
doctrine on which governments acted on behalf of private creditors in collecting payments on 
foreign sovereign debt was called “diplomatic protection”, the idea behind which is that 
governments may come to the aid of their citizens at their request, when they had not, or not 
 
                                                 
1 The first known default is reported as taking place in the fourth century BC, “when 10 of 13 Greek 
city-states owing debts to the Delos Temple walked away from their contractual obligations” (see 
Birdsall and Williamson, 2002: 14). Through time, official obligors of varying origins defaulted. For 
example, in 1789 King Gustav III founded what later became the Swedish National Debt Office or 
Riksgäldskontoret, the oldest debt office in the world. He did so in order to circumvent the domestic 
rules, which did not allow him to borrow abroad. Its first task was to finance a war against Russia. By 
around 1810, 75 per cent of the central government debt had been borrowed abroad. As Sweden could 
not repay, in 1815 it decided unilaterally to write off most of its foreign currency debt.    3
fully, been paid.
2 The ultimate remedy was dispatching gunboats to collect on the debt, as by 
capturing and operating the debtor’s customs house.
3  
Inefficiency and mismanagement of borrower governments were matched by the imprudent 
eagerness of private lenders. During the 19
th century, such countries as Egypt, Greece, 
Mexico, Peru, Portugal and Turkey borrowed extremely large sums in the form of bond 
issues, leading to suspended payments and numerous defaults with corresponding settlements. 
Sometimes, litigation by the creditors ended in gunboat diplomacy, a primary example of 
which was the invasion and bombing of the Mexican harbour of Veracruz by gunboats of the 
United Kingdom, France and Spain on the 31
st of October 1861, following the Mexican 
Government suspension of foreign debt service payments on the 17
th of July 1861. The 
French carried the intervention in Mexico beyond the debt issue, imposing an Austrian prince, 
Maximilian of Hapsburg, as Mexican Emperor, followed this act of war. His reign was never 
uncontested and ended with his execution in 1867. 
The treatment of the debts that triggered this punitive expedition and the French intervention 
is interesting. The defaulted Mexican bonds had been bought by foreign residents in Mexico 
and thus technically speaking these loans were domestic debt. However, when the Mexican 
Government was unable to repay, the foreign residents requested diplomatic protection from 
their embassies. The Mexican Congress acceded, as it delivered a special decree authorizing 
the Minister of Finance to negotiate with the diplomatic representatives to settle the foreign 
creditors’ claims. The Congress by doing so implicitly delivered a “guarantee-of-repayment” 
to the creditors. Thus, the private claims were indirectly treated as though they were bilateral 
official debt. In this case, the request for diplomatic protection led to “gunboat diplomacy” 
which paved the road to the debt restructuring agreement (see De la Cruz, 2005).
4 This 
notwithstanding, the debts – some £20 million – were never repaid (Suter and Stamm, 
1992: 652n). 
The precise content of debt rescheduling in the 19
th century took various forms including: the 
consolidation and reduction of the face value of existing bond issues; refinancing at 
substantially lower rates of interest; and cancellation or capitalization of arrears. An 
interesting example of capitalization of interest in arrears took place after Mexico defaulted 
on a series of bonds on 1 October 1827, after a campaign that started in 1824 led to the 
expulsion of Spanish nationals who had been the owners of the majority of production and 
trade firms.
5 This political expulsion decision led to a dramatic drop in government income 
that, in turn, led to the standstill in interest payments on the foreign currency bonds in 1827. 
In 1830, Mexico resumed servicing payments on the foreign debt, but there were £1.1 million 
 
                                                 
2 See De la Cruz (2005: 319). However, some governments did not always give this policy an official 
status. For example, in January 1848, Great Britain’s Chancellor, Lord Palmerston, issued an official 
communication stated that British diplomats would only be able to make “unofficial representations” 
on behalf of British investors in such cases, because British subjects that invested in lending to foreign 
governments instead in useful domestic British enterprises were imprudent and deserved the losses they 
were incurring (see Joaquín Cassasús, 1885), “Historia de la Deuda Contraída en Londres con un 
Apéndice sobre el Estado Actual de la Hacienda Pública”, México, Imprenta del Gobierno, as quoted 
by Bazant (1981: 69). 
3 However, political pressure was not the usual practice. Suter and Stamm (1992: 656–657) count 
20 cases of political and economic intervention to settle sovereign debt disputes from 1821 to 1975, out 
of 113 debt settlement cases; 15 of those interventions were in the period 1871–1925 and only one 
occurred after 1925. 
4 See also Bazant (1981, chapter V). Other examples of the request for diplomatic protection, in 
particular, by French and British creditors of Turkey and Egypt, can be found in Buljevich (2005: 5–6). 
5 See Bazant (1981, chapter III). It is worth recalling that Mexico obtained its independence from Spain 
in 1821, after a war that lasted 11 years.   4 
in interest arrears outstanding. This amount was impossible to pay in one instalment. In order 
to overcome this problem, Mexico negotiated to issue bonds bearing a face value of 
£1.6 million, which were swapped against the claims on the interest in arrears outstanding.
6 
However, the agreement had a very unusual feature: an effective five-year grace period on 
interest. That is, the bonds were actually only issued on 1 April 1836, and did not accrue any 
interest in the meantime. Discounting five years of unpaid interest, the present value of the 
bonds in 1831 was actually about £1.2 million (see Bazant, 1981).
7 
Other interesting restructurings included the bonds that Portugal defaulted on in 1902. They 
were converted at half to three-quarters of their nominal value and were repayable in 99 years 
at an annual interest rate of 3 per cent. In 1947, a settlement involving Peru included the 
cancellation of interest arrears, creating a new maturity period of 50 years and a sliding scale 
of interest between 1 to 2.5 per cent (Wynne, 2002: 377–379). 
The use of force for arriving at a workout from government debt crises also went through a 
certain questioning, as part of a more general rethinking of legitimate reasons for war. That is, 
as the 19
th century ended, governments increasingly began to look for other ways than wars to 
settle disputes and thus in 1899 and 1907, two intergovernmental conferences took place at 
The Hague on the rules and regulations of war and on the pacific settlement of international 
disputes. During the second Conference in 1907, there was an agreement to limit the 
employment of force for the recovery of defaulted sovereign debts, although the eschewing of 
force was conditional on the debtor government participating in a cooperative way in an 
international arbitration process.
8 
Unfortunately, the efforts to settle international disputes non-violently were a total failure, as 
only seven years after this conference was held, World War I devastated Europe. And, from 
the moment when war ended on the various battlefronts in Europe in 1918, the reparation and 
inter-Allied debt question commanded the attention of the world. With the onset of the world 
economic depression in the late 1920s and early 1930s, coupled with the reparation payments 
by the vanquished and repayments of inter-Allied debts, the economic life alike of the debtor 
and creditor countries was profoundly affected. 
Indeed, the global economic crisis radically changed the international approach to sovereign 
debt problems. The focus was on two fundamental questions. One was on whether a complete 
write-off of all reparation and inter-Allied war debt would retard or promote world economic 
recovery; the other question was on the benefit that the collection of these intergovernmental 
debts would bring to the creditor countries, if any.
9 These were questions of the 
macroeconomic impact of debt servicing on the debtors and, by feedback, on the creditors. 
These questions were addressing the necessity to overcome a world debt overhang originated 
by reparations and war debts that came to impose unacceptable burdens especially by the 
1920s–1930s when the depression set in. The questions, in other words, was at what point was 
 
                                                 
6 There were two bond issues involved. For the sake of simplicity, only the average outcome is 
presented here. For the details see Bazant (1981: 46–49). This was an excellent deal for the investors as 
other Mexican bond issues were trading at around 30 per cent of their face value in the London market 
at that time. See also a detailed exposition of these historical facts related to Mexico in Reyes Vayssade 
(2005). 
7 The agreement was signed on 1 April 1831. As the average interest rate was 5.5 per cent, the present 
value of the bonds at the date of signature in 1831was £1.22 million. 
8 The text of the agreement may be found on the website of the Avalon Project at the Yale Law School: 
the Laws of War at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/hague072.htm. See also the 
agreement on the arbitration process in the “Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International 
Disputes” at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/pacific.htm). 
9 See Moulton and Pasvolsky, (1932: chapter I, in particular page 5).   5
it more appropriate for the well-being of the international community to write-off the debts 
rather than collect them, or how long a breathing space did the debtors need before resuming 
total, partial, or any payments at all? 
In this context, it is instructive to recall the war reparations imposed on Germany as a result of 
World War I. The reparations imposed financial payment obligations that, while not loan 
repayments, required financial transfers like loans. At first, difficulties in meeting the 
obligations were addressed through new international credit to Germany. Later attempts at 
settlement shifted the focus from what Germany should pay to what she could pay: reduction 
in scheduled payments by Germany, and even their temporary suspension, was provided for, 
in addition to the possibility of subsequently resuming payments. 
The renegotiation of loans extended by the United States Government to its allies during 
World War I also deserves mention. The terms were adjusted when the initial conditions laid 
down by the US Congress were believed to be beyond the debtor countries’ capacity to fulfil. 
That is, it was appreciated that if no debt relief was granted, international economic 
conditions would continue to deteriorate. Thus, for example, the settlement with the United 
Kingdom provided for repayment over a period of 62 years as opposed to 25, and an interest 
rate of 3 per cent per annum for the first 10 years and 3.5 per cent for the remaining 52 years, 
rather than original rate of 4.5 per cent over 25 years. 
III. WORLD WAR II AFTERMATH AND SUBSEQUENT  
MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS 
After the end of the Second World War, a number of sovereign debt restructuring agreements 
were reached that took account of the debtor government’s perspective and its ability to repay 
debt and still maintain economic growth. First, the Anglo-American Financial Agreement of 
1946 accorded the British options to postpone payments in response to given conditions. In 
1956, certain conditions in the original repayment agreement were found to be ambiguous and 
likely unworkable due to changed conditions, so the agreement was amended to allow the 
United Kingdom, at her own option, to postpone payment of a number of principal and 
interest instalments. This amendment became known as the “bisque clause”. 
Another important milestone in the history of international debt agreements is the Multilateral 
London Conference on the German External Debt of 1953.
10 This Conference resulted in an 
agreement to settle all the pre-war external debt owed by German public and private debtors 
and large sums owed for various forms of official post-war economic aid. The face value of 
the debt was decreased to around one third of its nominal value and was to be paid over 
35 years with interest at a rate of 2.5 per cent per annum. This agreement took into account 
the repayment capacity of Germany’s economy, which at the time still had uncertain 
prospects. The settlement concerned only West Germany. 
1. Birth of the Paris Club 
The economic rehabilitation of the major industrialized countries after the war was followed 
by the resumption of private foreign lending, albeit mainly as bank loans instead of bonds, as 
the depression and war had seriously disrupted the international securities markets. The loans 
were, moreover, primarily associated with export credits that were insured for risk of loss by 
the governments of the exporters. Also, as a result of the independence of a large number of 
 
                                                 
10 See Cizauscas (1979), and for a detailed analysis of the agreement and its implications (Hersel, 2002; 
Guinnane, 2004).   6 
former colonies, the introduction of development aid targets and competition with the Soviet 
bloc during the Cold War, the governments of western developed economies directly 
extended large amounts of public credits to developing countries. In this environment and 
after applying expansionary policies and, to some extent, engaging in excessive commercial 
borrowing, several Latin American countries started to face debt payment problems by the 
mid-1950s. 
In 1956, as a result, some European countries met in Paris, under the chairmanship of the 
French Treasury to restore orderly payments relations with Argentina.
11 This meeting dealt 
with the renegotiation of supplier and buyer credits, which had become creditor country 
government claims through the export credit insurance process, and bilateral government-to-
government loans. This group came to be known as the “Paris Club” due to the meeting 
venue. 
Rescheduling agreements, similar to the one for Argentina, took place between 1956 and 
1966 for Brazil and Chile. It must be noted that the debt relief extended by the Paris Club in 
its early years could be characterized as the minimum short-term debt relief required. More 
favoured treatment was not considered because of what was viewed as mismanagement of the 
debtor countries’ economies. Long-term considerations were considered irrelevant. The point 
was to give the country enough time to be able to fully resume servicing the debt, the Paris 
Club being responsible to the member countries’ export-credit agencies and their treasuries, 
not the national development assistance agencies. As a result, two of the three countries, 
Argentina and Brazil attended the Paris Club five times altogether between 1956 and 1965.
12 
The short-term approach usually applied by the early Paris Club not only differed from the 
previous post-war settlements noted earlier, but also from certain politically sensitive cases 
treated in the 1960s. There were at least two of them: Turkey and Indonesia, the latter being a 
marked contrast to the simultaneous case of Ghana. 
2. Early examples of politically sensitive cases: Turkey 
Turkey experienced a rapid increase in external debt levels during the early post-war years 
due to expansionist policies. Severe debt servicing difficulties followed. However, since 
Turkey was a member of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), 
Western countries continued to extend, through their official export credit insurance agencies, 
large amounts of essentially short-term credits, even when serious foreign debt payment 
difficulties became apparent. The OEEC also convened a debt conference for Turkey where a 
rescheduling of the country’s commercial debt was obtained. In 1959, a multilateral 
agreement was reached that is notable because it included uninsured supplier and buyer 
credits, mostly involving United States firms,
13 and terms more generous than those extended 
 
                                                 
11 The countries were Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden, 
Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland 
did not reschedule because of the minor amounts of their claims, thereby introducing the “de minimis” 
clause into what became the Paris Club. In August 1957, the original Paris Club countries, minus 
France plus Germany, met in Rome in order to agree on Germany’s admission to the Club. The 
condition for Germany to join was its acceptance of the debt funding arrangements for Argentina 
agreed to by the other members of the Paris Club in May 1956 (see The Review of the River Plate, 11 
August 1982: 134). The United States and Japan joined the Club later. Presently, any interested creditor 
government might be part of the Club for specific meetings. 
12 Argentina: 1956, 1962 and 1965; Brazil: 1962 and 1964. 
13 Rescheduling required complicated negotiations between the Government of the United States and 
over 100 private firms.   7
by the Paris Club up to that time. It also associated debt rescheduling with balance-of-
payments loans by members of the OEEC and the United States. 
In spite of this generous and unusual rescheduling agreement, Turkey continued to experience 
external debt payment difficulties. In 1962, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), successor to OEEC, set up the Consortium for Turkey which, in 1965, 
arranged to extend relief on payments due to member countries, including some debt 
previously rescheduled under the 1959 agreement. Some of the members chose to extend 
balance-of-payments loans instead of direct debt relief. 
Turkey’s second multilateral debt rescheduling is notable because of several particularities: 
first, the rescheduling of previously rescheduled debt; second, the non-uniform terms 
extended by the creditors;
14 and last but not least, the explicit recognition that balance-of-
payments support loans are as efficient as debt relief in terms of the net resource transfer. All 
of the ingredients in Turkey’s rescheduling exercise showed the association of debt 
rescheduling and official aid, which the Paris Club itself explicitly avoided until the mid-
1990s when the Initiative for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) was adopted, 
which we discuss later. Turkey’s strategic military importance to NATO, without any doubt, 
was an important reason for those favourable treatments. 
3. Indonesia versus Ghana 
Indonesia and Ghana went into a debt rescheduling negotiation process that followed the 
overthrow of their two heads of State, Sukarno of Indonesia and Nkrumah of Ghana, at the 
same time. However, the origin of external indebtedness was different. In Indonesia’s case it 
was military debt, and in Ghana’s case it was the drop of the international price of cocoa, a 
principal export commodity, that triggered the external debt payments crisis. 
The Indonesian case was complicated because more than half of her debt was owed to non-
Paris Club official creditors, i.e. to the socialist bloc and in particular to the Soviet Union for 
military loans.
15 An outsider, Dr. Hermann Abs, a prominent German banker who was the 
principal negotiator at the London Conference in 1953 on behalf of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, was called in to undertake a comprehensive study of Indonesia’s balance-of-
payments prospects with a view to developing a long-term solution to what was called the 
“Sukarno debt” and included loans owed to socialist countries. This assessment would be 
based on the Indonesian capacity to repay.  
Dr. Abs’ international reputation and objectivity allowed him to put forward a proposal that, 
with modifications by the creditors, was accepted by the Paris Club. The Indonesian debt, 
including concessional loans and previously rescheduled debt, was consolidated over 30 
years. Bleak prospects for the Indonesian economy led to the addition of a bisque clause, 
similar to the one in the Anglo-American agreement, which allowed Indonesia to defer at her 
option up to one-half of the principal payments due during the early years of the rescheduling 
agreement. The deferred payments were to be repaid, at a 4 per cent rate of interest, during the 
 
                                                 
14 However, the different terms extended by the creditors were subject to review by the Consortium. 
This arrangement was unique and not repeated until approval of the Cologne Terms for the poorest 
countries in November 1999 (see below).  
15 These debts were rescheduled on “essentially the same (and, indeed, in certain respects, slightly more 
liberal) terms” than the Paris Club debt (see Cizauskas, 1979: 204).   8 
final years of the agreement. Indonesia availed herself fully of this arrangement, which has 
not since been granted to any other country.
16 
Ghana’s case was quite different. The Paris Club provided only partial and short-term relief. 
Ghana could not understand nor accept the difference in treatment between her and Indonesia, 
since both reschedulings took place at practically the same time and involved the same 
creditors. Once irregularities were discovered in many supplier contracts, whose payments 
had been rescheduled at essentially commercial rates, Ghana complained and eventually 
repudiated all previous repayments arrangements. This situation created extremely long 
negotiations that finally ended in a settlement in 1974. The agreed terms were repayment over 
18 years after a 10-year grace period at a 2.5 per cent interest rate. 
Finally, the terms were reasonably consistent with Ghana’s capacity to repay but, like most 
debt rescheduling negotiation processes, had a very high price in terms of the time, resources 
and good will of both creditors and debtor. This was due to the limited nature of the previous 
agreements. Possibly the main reason for the difference in treatment between Indonesia and 
Ghana, by the same creditors within virtually the same period, was the absence of any 
political motivation for the creditors to view the Ghanaian debt rescheduling as requiring 
anything more than the typical Paris Club arrangements. These experiences, including 
Turkey’s, illustrate the importance of the political ingredient in the Paris Club rescheduling 
terms. 
4. Involvement of international organizations 
By 1961, the staffs of the World Bank and the IMF were being invited to attend the Paris 
Club meetings as observers and were increasingly being asked to supply information and 
technical advice. Much later, in 1978, the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) started to attend the Paris Club meetings as an observer and began 
to present the creditors with an analysis of the debtor situation taking into account medium 
and long-term economic development perspectives.
17 The contributions of these three 
institutions often went beyond these services, as they would provide unofficial suggestions 
helpful for both debtors and creditors. 
 
                                                 
16 A bisque clause was included implicitly in the Mexican agreement of 1986. The Mexican 
Government was allowed to defer payments if the oil prices decreased below an agreed floor. The 
price-floor was negotiated and included in the Mexican agreement with the IMF, and was applicable to 
private as well as bilateral creditors. However, the price-floor was so low that the bisque clause was 
never triggered. 
17 In 1975, UNCTAD’s inter-sessional oversight body, the Trade and Development Board (TDB), 
endorsed a recommendation of an UNCTAD Ad hoc Group of Governmental Experts that UNCTAD 
“be invited to participate in the multilateral debt negotiations on the same basis as the representatives of 
other international organizations” (TDB resolution 132 (XV), paragraph 8). The intention was that 
UNCTAD – formally in the capacity of observer – help the debtor countries present their case to the 
creditors. However, the resolution did not specify which negotiations and the Paris Club did not 
volunteer to invite UNCTAD. Finally, in March 1978, the TDB adopted resolution 165 S-IX, which 
said that sovereign debt problems should be addressed in “an appropriate multilateral framework 
consisting of interested parties” (paragraph 10-b). This was understood to be an implicit reference to 
the Paris Club as the only “appropriate multilateral framework”, and opened the door to UNCTAD 
participation based on TDB resolution 132 (XV). The first country to make use of this resolution was 
Peru in November 1978, although the Paris Club Secretariat was not aware of the resolution and the 
UNCTAD delegation was not allowed into the negotiation room. This misunderstanding was cleared up 
and since 1979, UNCTAD has attended practically all Paris Club meetings that involved developing 
countries or economies in transition.   9
The Paris Club normally requires the debtor country to adopt a stabilization programme 
approved and monitored by the IMF, typically in the form of a Stand-by Arrangement. This 
procedure relieves the creditors of the need to impose and monitor economic policies in 
debtor countries. In the Paris Club member countries’ view, this requirement allows for 
impartial monitoring of the debtor country’s economic performance, and thus the monitoring 
of progress in the recovery of its debt repayment capacity.
18 
5. More special cases 
A few debtor countries have attended the Paris Club without a prior agreement with the IMF. 
One was Chile, in 1972, under the presidency of Salvador Allende and another was Cuba, 
which did not belong to the Bretton Woods institutions in 1982 and 1984. Other countries that 
did not belong to the Bretton Woods Institutions at the time also went before the Paris Club 
and reached an agreement, including Poland in 1981 and 1984, Mozambique in 1984, and 
Angola in 1989. 
In the Chilean case, Chile’s refusal to create a link between debt relief and an agreement with 
the IMF was resolved when she agreed to issue a unilateral declaration of intent with 
implications for economic policy comparable to those normally included in the IMF’s Stand-
by Arrangements. Another issue, subsequently resolved during the Pinochet regime, was the 
refusal of the Chilean Government to recognize the obligations arising from nationalizations 
as debt. The terms Chile obtained in the renegotiation were typical Paris Club arrangements, 
which were followed by two additional rounds of debt relief shortly thereafter. These latter 
renegotiations, in which some European members of the Paris Club refused to participate, had 
a highly political flavour because of the then-recent overthrow of the Allende regime. 
In the Cuban case, the non-membership of Cuba in the Bretton Woods institutions and thus 
the absence of an agreement with the IMF, were solved by the creation of a task force 
composed of representatives of selected creditor countries that went to Havana in 1982 to 
assess the Cuban economic situation and its declaration of intent. For this occasion, 
UNCTAD was called on to draft an Economic Memorandum describing Cuban economic 
policies and prospects for the information of the international community in general and of 
the creditors in particular. UNCTAD was invited to Havana at the same time as the creditors 
in order to carry out this task. As in the case of Chile, the issue of compensation for 
nationalizations of property of nationals of the United States existed in the case of Cuba. 
However, the creditor countries managed for this country to stay away from the negotiations 
room in Paris.
19 The debt concerned in this negotiation was the debt owed to Western 
 
                                                 
18 However, the debtors have challenged the impartiality of the World Bank and the IMF on many 
occasions by arguing that these two institutions are creditors themselves. 
19 The Cuban rescheduling was diplomatically made “outside the Paris Club”, because of the very 
sensitive issue of the US claim that the Castro regime expropriations created additional foreign debt. 
The meetings were thus held in Paris, if not at the Paris Club, and without the United States delegation, 
but they still followed the Paris Club principles, rules and procedures. One consequence is that the 
Cuban “Paris Club” meetings are not cited by the Paris Club Secretariat and are not included in the 
Paris Club website.   10 
countries and Japan in convertible currency having its origin in export credits insured by the 
creditor countries.
20 The terms obtained were in line with standard Paris Club arrangements. 
IV. PARIS CLUB MECHANISMS AND PARTICULARITIES 
Frequently, as noted earlier, the rescheduling terms the Paris Club granted were deliberately 
extended on a “short leash” basis, with the aim of facilitating monitoring of the debtor’s 
economic performance and helping to determine whether additional debt relief might need to 
be provided in the future. The possibility of an extension, known as the “Good Will Clause”, 
came to be included in the Paris Club “Agreed Minute”, the negotiated outcome of a Paris 
Club meeting on a country’s debt problem (see below). In principle, the clause allowed the 
debtor country to request further debt relief in the future. Paradoxically, this “Good Will 
Clause” is implicit recognition by the creditors that the debt relief granted might prove 
inadequate. 
Nevertheless, as was seen above, several debt reschedulings even before the widespread debt 
crises of the 1980s were ultimately concessional and took into account the capacity of the 
debtor to repay. In all cases, however, the agreements were reached after a lengthy and 
difficult negotiation process. It is important to point out that the cost in time, resources and 
effort, for both creditors and debtors, was higher than it needed to be in most cases. 
1. A “Code of Conduct” for the 1980s 
That the government creditors had become the sole decision makers over what kinds of debt 
relief treatments were accorded to different developing countries did not go unnoticed. In the 
mid-1970s at the “North-South Conference” in Paris that had been prompted by the 1974 call 
for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) at the United Nations, itself following the 
successful price increases of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 
a proposal to create a set of international guidelines for handling external debt negotiations 
was discussed. No agreement was reached at this conference on this item (or virtually any 




                                                 
20 The economic boycott established by the United States on Cuba precluded provision of any export 
credit by United States residents to this country. Thus, the United States had no export credits that 
needed to be covered by the negotiation, whereas the other Western countries and Japan did. This fact 
also explains why these creditor countries were eager to leave aside the United States and go ahead 
with the negotiation with Cuba. Chile and Cuba have not been the only countries that managed to leave 
aside the question of nationalization compensation: Peru in 1968 and 1970 did the same thing as well 
(see Cizauscas, 1979: 207). 
21 UNCTAD’s Ad hoc Group of Governmental Experts, mentioned in an earlier footnote, had identified 
a set of “common elements” that the TDB recommended creditors should consider (TDB resolution 
132 (XV), para. 2). Following up on that, the Fourth UNCTAD Conference in May 1976 requested the 
UNCTAD Secretary-General to convene a new Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Debt 
and Development Problems of Interested Developing Countries, in particular to carry forward the 
incipient work on a code of conduct.   11
Developed and developing countries reached an agreement on the first draft of the guidelines 
in March 1978.
22 The 1978 draft was refined and the guidelines were finally adopted in 
September 1980.
23 The UNCTAD Secretariat was requested to report to the Trade and 
Development Board (TDB) on their implementation, which the Secretariat does each time the 
TDB requests it.
24 It is noteworthy to say that these are the only guidelines on foreign debt 
rescheduling ever agreed upon by debtor and creditor governments in an international forum 
through consensus. Michel Camdessus, who at the time was Chairman of the Paris Club, 
interpreted the guidelines as establishing the international legitimacy of the Paris Club within 
the international financial architecture.
25 
The guidelines were drafted in the spirit of a “Code of Conduct” for debtors and creditors. 
The guidelines are very broad as to the nature of debt and of economic symptoms that might 
lead to a request, which can only be on the initiative of the debtor country, to reschedule debt 
service payments. The OECD countries have claimed that the guidelines are applicable only 
for bilateral debt because there was no representative from the private financial sector in 
attendance at the TDB when it adopted Resolution 222 (XXI). Thus, the private financial 
sector would not be bound by the agreement. Nevertheless, the guidelines consider the 
external debt problem in general, and do not differentiate official from private debt sources. 
2. Paris Club’s principles 
Meanwhile, the Paris Club member governments agreed among themselves to operate under a 
set of principles to guide their consideration of country cases: case-by-case treatment of 
debtor countries; consensus decision-making by the members of the Paris Club; 
conditionality entailed in implementation of an economic adjustment programme put in place 
by each debtor country; solidarity among Paris Club members via the implementation of the 
Agreed Minute; and request that the debtor country seek comparability of treatment for 
similar debts by creditors that do not belong to the Paris Club. 
The principles emerged from the practice in the Club, which became increasingly routine, as 
the Club met more and more frequently, especially once the 1980s debt crisis emerged. 
Today, the country representatives meet on a monthly basis in Paris, not only for scheduling 
negotiation sessions, but also for methodological matters including technical and political 
issues. Both the frequency of meetings and the diversity of subjects covered have created a 
 
                                                 
22 The Group met several times from 1976 to 1978, leading to an important consensus resolution of the 
UNCTAD Trade and Development Board in March 1978 (165 (S-IX)). OECD countries made 
substantial concessions on debt relief (Part A of the Resolution), but resisted the formal introduction of 
a debt restructuring mechanism (Part B of the Resolution). It also implicitly introduced the Paris Club 
as the “appropriate multilateral framework” for international consideration of debt problems of 
developing countries, as noted earlier. Part A of the resolution contained an agreement on “retroactive 
terms adjustment” on aid for a group of 30 least developed countries (i.e. repayment obligations on 
outstanding aid loans were changed to the easier terms that donors were now offering these countries). 
Some OECD countries that had decided to give aid exclusively as grants implemented this resolution 
by cancelling old debts, making this a precursor of the HIPC Initiative. 
23 The debate ended in September 1980 when TDB Resolution 222 (XXI) was adopted by consensus. 
Part B of the resolution contains the “Detailed Features for Future Operations Relating to the Debt 
Problems of Interested Developing Countries”. The Resolution was adopted without dissent, albeit with 
France abstaining to emphasize its strict neutrality, being host of the debt renegotiations, as this time 
the resolution made explicit reference to the Paris Club as the recognized multilateral forum for 
bilateral debt rescheduling. The text can be found in UNCTAD (1986: 139–140). 
24 See for instance UNCTAD (1989a). 
25 See Camdessus (1984).   12 
kind of Paris Club modus operandi in which the country representatives know each other 
quite well.
26 
Another particularity of the Paris Club is its asymmetry. In other words, the solidarity and 
comparability are among the creditors, but not among the debtors. This is because the Paris 
Club is a cartel of creditor countries. There is no cartel of debtor countries. The only attempt 
to create one was the “Consenso de Cartagena” in the late 1980s, under the initiative of 11 
Latin American governments, in particular Uruguay and her Chancellor at the time, Enrique 
Iglesias. The whole effort was in vain because the larger countries of the group did not share 
their negotiation leverage with the rest. On the contrary, they behaved as “lone rangers”, on 
the expectation that they would obtain a better deal working alone than if they had 
participated in the negotiation as part of a cartel. 
3. The Paris Club Agreed Minute 
The term “Agreed Minute” can indicate either a written report of a discussion held at a 
conference or meeting, or the agreement reached by the parties attending the conference or 
the meeting. The Paris Club Agreed Minute indisputably belongs to the second category. It 
stipulates the overall terms that the creditors will accord, although it is only the first step for 
the debtor, who must then renegotiate the specific terms of all the loans covered by the 
agreement, country by country, in a series of bilateral negotiations. 
The Agreed Minute might have been given the status of an international treaty subject to 
international laws in the Vienna Convention sense.
27 However, the Paris Club creditor 
countries themselves do not consider the Agreed Minute as legally binding. This position 
comes from a pragmatic approach taken by the creditor countries, i.e. it gives flexibility to 
each creditor to determine the technicalities of the rescheduling. Another reason is that it 
eliminates the risk of legal suits by the debtor countries as well as needing to have the Agreed 
Minute ratified by the creditor countries’ parliaments. The Agreed Minute is confidential in 
nature and is kept as such by the creditor countries’ governments.
28 
The Agreed Minute is signed in a relatively short period of time usually after only 1 or 2 days 
of negotiations. The national delegations have full authority to sign the Agreed Minute as 
long as it is within the guidelines provided by their respective capitals. In general, the head of 
the delegation from a creditor country is a senior officer from the Ministry of Finance.
29 
Debtor countries accord high importance to the Agreed Minute, as it guides the bilateral 
negotiations that follow that result in legal agreements to alter the debt contracts. The 
authority of the representatives that the debtor countries send to the meetings demonstrates 
 
                                                 
26 There are 19 permanent members at the Paris Club: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, the Russian Federation, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States. Other creditors that have participated in 
specific meetings include: Abu Dhabi, Argentina, Brazil, Israel, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Mexico, 
Morocco, New Zealand, Portugal, South Africa, Trinidad and Tobago and Turkey. 
27 See Holmgren (1998: 217). 
28 There are certain exceptions, like the United States, which publishes the bilateral agreement once it is 
reached and thus the elements of the Agreed Minute. Presently, there is also a summary of the 
rescheduling outcome on the Paris Club web site, but not of the full Agreed Minute which continues to 
be considered as a confidential document. 
29 With some exceptions like the United States, whose delegation is headed by a State Department 
officer and seconded by Treasury Department and Eximbank officers.   13
how important they are regarded. In most of the cases, the head of the debtor country 
delegation is the Minister of Finance. 
However, the drafting of the Agreed Minute is solely the creditor countries’ responsibility. 
The debtor country is shown an already-drafted Agreed Minute as a first proposal and there is 
no possibility to change it in spirit or structure. Negotiations would concern the financial 
terms but not the structure, clauses or interpretation of the Agreed Minute. And finally, the 
creditor countries’ interpretation prevails as long as the head of the debtor country’s 
delegation signs, and thus ratifies, the Agreed Minute. 
More precisely, during the negotiations at the Paris Club, the debtor country does not discuss 
the terms of relief directly with the creditors. After the initial plenary meeting in which the 
country and the international organizations deliver their statements, and the creditors’ 
questions are answered by them, the debtor country and the observers, with the exception of 
the IMF, are asked to leave the plenary meeting room. The debtor country delegation is 
assigned a room within the building. The creditor countries negotiate among themselves their 
first proposal to the debtor, which should be obtained by consensus. At this point, the 
Chairman of the Paris Club goes alone to meet the debtor country’s delegation at the room it 
has been assigned to present the proposal. The debtor country studies the proposal and 
discusses it with the Chairman and eventually proposes modifications. The Chairman conveys 
the debtor country’s comments and proposals for modifications to the creditors. The debtor 
country’s delegation never argues directly with the creditor countries’ delegations. All the 
communications are made through the Chairman, who goes from one group in one room to 
the other group in the other room as long as the negotiation continues. 
The binding nature of the Agreed Minute has more of a “moral” and “good faith” nature than 
a legal one. In this sense, it is a “gentlemen’s agreement”, because it is based on the honour, 
engagement and good faith of all parties concerned, especially the creditor parties. Not only 
do the creditor countries have a high degree of confidence in each other owing to the 
familiarity from frequent meetings, but they have a mutual interest in avoiding that some 
creditors receive disproportionately more repayment of loans than others. This causes them to 
fully respect the commitments taken through the Agreed Minute. In the same way, the 
creditor countries follow the agreed principles so as to avoid risking exclusion from the Club. 
Creditor countries show less confidence in the debtor country. This is seen in the fact that the 
debtor country has to implement verifiable conditionality that shows that it will abide by its 
engagements. Indeed, the engagements in the Agreed Minute are sometimes of a difficult 
nature, such as stringent IMF adjustment measures or the application of the comparability 
clause to possibly recalcitrant private creditors. Delivering on these engagements is the debtor 
country’s responsibility. Thus, mechanisms of monitoring and surveillance are important parts 
of the agreement. However, the agreement also contains elements of good faith between the 
creditors and the debtor country, such as in the “good will” clause, which as noted above 
leaves open the possibility of further debt relief in future assuming the debtor fulfils its 
engagements vis-à-vis the Paris Club and the international financial institutions in good faith. 
An element of good faith can also be found in the comparability clause, which trusts the 
debtor to negotiate relief with third-party creditors that do not belong to the Paris Club, so as 
not to accord them seniority to Paris Club creditors as regards repayment terms.   14 
V. PARIS CLUB OPERATIONS IN THE 1980s AND 1990s 
While the global financial threats that accompanied the 1980s debt crisis mainly had to do 
with the consequences for the international banks that had over lent, middle-income countries 
in debt crisis – including some in the socialist bloc as well as many developing countries – 
also sought relief from their official creditors, as did low-income borrowers without 
significant commercial bank debt. Until late in the decade, there was no write down of 
commercial bank debt or of Paris Club debt. Both types of creditors, working with the IMF, 
offered “short leash” reschedulings, which had to be regularly repeated. However, the crisis 
converted the Paris Club from an occasional forum that met on ad hoc cases into an 
unavoidable figure in the international financial landscape, impossible to circumvent by 
countries that, encountering debt service difficulties, tried to find their way to normalized 
payments. By the late 1980s, moreover, the financial terms of Paris Club debt operations 
became important enough for decision by the heads of State of the major industrialized 
countries at their annual summit meetings. 
1. The 1980s debt crisis and its relevance for the Paris Club 
The debt problems of the 1980s affected all types of developing countries and all types of 
debt. The amount of outstanding public medium- and long-term debt held by developing 
countries rose from about US$270 billion in 1977 to US$470 billion in 1981.
30 Short-term and 
non-guaranteed debts are believed to have grown even more rapidly. Countries borrowed 
heavily in this period as interest rates were low (even negative in real terms at some points), 
international private credit was readily available, and financing needs were substantial. 
However, the borrowing became unsustainable as the 1980s arrived. The crisis was triggered 
by the following developments: first, the precipitous rise in interest rates to unprecedented 
levels after 1979 and the associated swings in exchange rates, as developed countries sought 
to roll back inflation; second, the sharp slackening of import demand in developed countries 
resulting from the steep and then prolonged recession that started in 1980; third, the collapse 
of primary commodity prices, including oil, beginning in 1980; fourth, the rapid increase in 
the relative prices of imported manufactured goods, which together with the fall in export 
prices entailed a deterioration of developing countries’ terms of trade; and last but not least, 
the growing wave of protectionism that characterized foreign economic policy in the 1980s in 
developed market economy countries. 
In the difficult economic context of the 1980s, it became necessary for some debtor country 
governments to further enlarge their already swollen sovereign debt by taking over non-
guaranteed private sector external debt. Sometimes that took them to the Paris Club. One 
example is given by the first time Mexico visited the Paris Club, which was in 1983. The debt 
dealt with at this Paris Club meeting was not the Mexican public debt but the non-guaranteed 
arrears that the Mexican private sector owed to foreign suppliers. This debt had been insured 
by the official insurance agencies in the exporting countries, and thus became claims of the 
export credit agencies after Mexico’s crisis erupted. However, the Mexican Government had 
not guaranteed them. Mexican industry was paralyzed by the crisis, because a large part of the 
imported intermediate goods needed for local production were cut off.
31 
To handle this case, the Mexican Government rescheduled debt payments in foreign currency 
while the private sector debtors continued to service their debts in local currency, following 
 
                                                 
30 UNCTAD (1983). See paragraph 67 and table A.4. 
31 As a result of this private-sector debt crisis, the insurance coverage by the official insurers in 
developed countries was suspended, triggering an interruption of imported supplies.   15
the original loan schedules and depositing their payments with the central bank, which created 
a sinking fund to honour the Paris Club rescheduling agreement.
32 The standard Paris Club 
agreement terms were obtained in this rescheduling. The private sector arrears were thus put 
under public responsibility with the central bank assuming the exchange rate risk. 
2. Making Paris Club policy at G-7 summits 
At the Summit of the Group of 7 (G-7) in Venice in 1987, the major industrialized countries 
acknowledged the need for some additional effort to address the weakened development 
prospects of the poorer countries, including in the realm of external debt. Indeed, by 1987, 
rescheduling agreements for developing countries’ official bilateral debt were already 
characterized by a dichotomy of treatment: the rescheduled maturities of sub-Saharan African 
countries averaged 18 years and the figure for the other developing countries was only 9.8 
years. It was now agreed that the poorest countries undertaking adjustment efforts should also 
have the possibility of paying lower interest rates on their existing debt. It was further decided 
that an agreement should be reached to be implemented through the Paris Club on longer 
repayment periods to ease the debt service burden. As a result, the major developed countries 
agreed the next year at the Toronto Summit in June 1988 on the Toronto Options for 
Rescheduling Official Debt of Low-Income Countries. The “Toronto Terms” gave creditor 
countries the option to partially write-off a poor country’s debt, and give it longer repayment 
periods or concessional interest rates on the remainder.
33 This would be the first in a series of 
gradual steps by the G-7, each of which acknowledged that they had previously demanded too 
much debt servicing by many of the poorest countries. 
As was noted by UNCTAD in early 1989, 
The pervasiveness of debt problems is such that debt rescheduling, once an isolated, one-
off mechanism designed to overcome a temporary debt-servicing problem, has now 
become an established feature of the financial system (UNCTAD, 1989a, paragraph 57). 
This also affected access to new funds, as most of the export credit insurers were only ready 
to restore official insurance coverage once the debtor had concluded the implementation of 
the bilateral agreements of the Paris Club rescheduling, and the export insurance cover would 
continue as long as obligations under the agreement were being met.
34 
In addition to beginning to take account of the deep dichotomy between the poorest debtor 
countries and the emerging economies, the Paris Club also departed from its standard terms 
for some countries by offering “multi-year rescheduling agreements” (MYRAs). This was a 
relaxation of the “short-leash” approach noted earlier and an attempt to help countries plan 
over a longer horizon. 
In 1989 and 1990, these policies began to be implemented. Bolivia was the first country 
outside sub-Saharan Africa to obtain Toronto terms in early 1990 and there were agreements 
on MYRAs for the Philippines, Mexico, Mali, Bolivia and Mozambique. In each case, an IMF 
programme covered the length of the period during which obligations were postponed, i.e. the 
length of the MYRA. 
 
                                                 
32 The sinking fund was known as FICORCA (Fideicomiso para la Cobertura de Riesgos Cambiarios) 
and was managed by the central bank (Banco de México). 
33 For an explanation and analysis of the Toronto terms see UNCTAD (1989b:35 box 7). The idea 
behind this was that whatever the choice of the creditor country for providing debt relief to the debtor, 
the present value of it would be equivalent to the other choices taken by the other creditor countries. 
The Toronto terms are now replaced by the Naples terms (see below). 
34 See K. B. Dillon, L. Duran-Downing and M. Xafa (1988).   16 
3. Special cases and evolving policies in the early 1990s 
Although the Paris Club was thus adopting policies meant to apply to all countries or all 
countries in a pre-defined class, it broke with this approach for politically important cases. An 
early sign of this was in 1990, as the rescheduling of the Polish debt marked a significant 
departure from standard Paris Club terms for middle-income countries. The so-called 
“consolidation period” (the time during which the debtor receives relief from repayment 
obligations) was 15 months, payable over 15 years, which was an unusually long maturity. 
However, this was not the final arrangement, as the creditor countries agreed to set up a 
working group with the Polish Government in order to further examine Poland’s financial 
obligations to Paris Club governments. Within this group, Poland would seek a long-term 
solution to its problem through debt reduction. 
In early 1991, Egypt joined Poland in receiving exceptional treatment: for both countries, 
rather than the “Houston Terms” for which they would otherwise have qualified, a 50 per cent 
reduction was agreed in the entire eligible stock of official bilateral debt. For Poland debt 
reduction would occur in two stages: 30 per cent up front and 20 per cent after 3 years. For 
Egypt, the reduction would take place in three stages: 15 per cent up front, 15 per cent after 
18 months and 20 per cent after 3 years. Debt reduction was implemented through a menu of 
options including partial interest capitalization on concessional terms, in addition to principal 
and interest reduction. In addition, creditor countries agreed to a voluntary debt swap facility, 
which could include up to an additional 10 per cent of outstanding claims. In both cases, the 
implementation of the stages following the upfront reduction was conditioned on the 
successful completion of an IMF arrangement. 
In 1991, Peru’s treatment also diverged from standard Paris Club practices. In this case, the 
Club agreed to defer all “moratorium interest” payments falling due during the consolidation 
period,
35 and to reschedule arrears on “post-cut-off date” debt.
36 Peru rescheduled 70 per cent 
of its moratorium interest over 5 years, including 2 year’s of grace after the consolidation 
period, with the remaining 30 per cent to be paid over 18 months. Arrears on post-cut-off date 
debt were to be paid over six years after the consolidation period. The deferment was 
contingent on Peru’s performance under an IMF “rights accumulation” programme (a form of 
IMF adjustment programme for countries in arrears to IMF itself and seeking to return to 
normal IMF assistance), as agreed to in 1991. This special treatment may be explained by the 
change of regime in Peru, with Mr. Fujimori replacing as President Mr. Alan García, whose 
regime imposed a ceiling of 10 per cent on the debt service to exports ratio, making the 
country incur substantial arrears. 
In April 1996, a five-day Paris Club meeting took place to reschedule the debt contracted or 
guaranteed by the former Soviet Union and for which the Russian Federation had assumed 
 
                                                 
35 In the Paris Club jargon, repayments falling due to Paris Club members during the consolidation 
period are postponed and are treated, in effect, as though refinanced with new loans repayable 
according to a new repayment schedule; the debtor is usually required to pay the so-called “moratorium 
interest rate” on the outstanding balance of deferred payments.   
36 In its standard practice, the Paris Club only consolidates repayments on “eligible” loans, which will 
be those signed before some specified “cut-off date”. In a serial restructuring for a country, the initial 
cut-off date is kept from one Club restructuring to another. Creditors are reluctant to update the cut-off 
date once set, since it would add new loans (and more relief) in the succeeding renegotiations. 
Moreover, maintaining a fixed cut-off date says to government creditors that any post cut-off date loans 
they extend will not be subject to restructuring. This is to say that the new loans would have higher 
repayment priority than old ones, which is meant to encourage the creditors to renew their lending. As 
the Peruvian case showed, however, countries may not be able or willing to make payments on their 
post cut-off date debt and some restructuring of those obligations then becomes necessary.   17
responsibility. The Paris Club agreed to a comprehensive rescheduling in two stages, the first 
one a rescheduling of debt servicing payments falling due over a specified number of years, 
and the second a restructuring of all remaining obligations on the covered stock of debt. 
Besides the substantial amount involved in this agreement (around US$40 billion), it was 
exceptional because it was a stock-of-debt rescheduling on non-concessional terms, the only 
one in the whole history of the Paris Club. 
For a last set of special cases, the Paris Club repeatedly eased the terms of relief it made 
available to the poorest countries, on each occasion following decisions reached at meetings 
of heads of State of the G-7, the largest creditors in the Paris Club. Thus, in December 1991, 
the low-income countries were granted new concessional terms, referred to as the London 
terms.
37 Moreover, in most Paris Club agreements at that time, there were provisions for 
partial debt reduction through swaps of debt for social, environmental or investment 
activities.
38 
The practice also kept evolving. In the case of Uganda, the Paris Club creditors agreed, in 
June 1992, to defer the payment of arrears on debt not covered by the Agreed Minute (mainly 
post-cut-off debt) by an average of one year. In the case of Zambia, 30 per cent of the 
moratorium interest and the service on post-cut-off date debt falling due during the 
consolidation period were deferred until its end (one and a half years). The remaining 70 per 
cent of moratorium interest was to be paid six months after the consolidation period. 
Following the G-7 Summit in Naples, the Paris Club creditors agreed in December 1994 to a 
further easing of the terms for the poorest and most indebted countries. The Naples terms 
included an option to reduce debt flows or debt stock by up to 67 per cent.
39 Reducing the 
stock of non-concessional debt was reserved for exceptional cases and was called an “exit” 
option because the beneficiary would no longer need to request debt restructuring from the 
Paris Club. The countries eligible for Naples terms were those that had received Toronto or 
London terms.
40 To qualify for the 67 per cent reduction, the countries had to have either a 
GDP per capita of less than US$500 or a ratio of debt to exports exceeding 350 per cent. 
Candidate countries for the stock treatment should have shown a satisfactory “track record” in 
 
                                                 
37 Under the Toronto terms, mentioned earlier, creditors could select from different options that yielded 
at most a debt reduction of 33 per cent in present value (PV) terms. The London terms allowed for a 
50 per cent debt reduction in PV terms (see below on “PV”). 
38 For example, in a “debt-for-nature” swap, a Paris Club creditor would cancel specific debts in 
exchange for a commitment of the debtor government to undertake specified public investments, as in a 
national forest, generally with the intention to apply foregone debt servicing payments to the new 
projects. 
39 In these Paris Club principles for treating low-income country debt (and in the HIPC Initiative to be 
described below) the stock of debt is said to be measured as “net present value.” In fact, the measure 
actually is a simple “present value” (PV) calculation. Creditors insist on measuring the stock of debt by 
calculating the PV of future debt service (principal and interest), discounted at a commercial rate. This 
is relevant for instruments that are tradable in the secondary market because the PV would reflect the 
instruments’ market value, but it is artificial for non-tradable official debt for which there is no 
secondary market. Notwithstanding, this kind of calculation is useful for creditor countries as it can 
measure the opportunity cost of concessional lending, on one hand, and on the other hand, it is also 
useful for a fair burden sharing of the rescheduling operations among the different creditors. However, 
what is relevant for debtor countries are the nominal value and the actual rate of interest applied to the 
loan, as this is what the debtor actually pays.  
40 These countries were: Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone, Togo, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Viet Nam and Zambia.   18 
economic policy and be able, on the creditors’ view, to implement the debt agreement in order 
to exit once and for all from the rescheduling process. 
VI. A CURRENT FOCUS: THE HEAVILY INDEBTED  
POOR COUNTRIES INITIATIVE 
In September 1996, the two Bretton Woods policy-making committees, the IMF Interim 
Committee and the joint IMF and World Bank Development Committee, endorsed a 
programme of action proposed by the Managing Director of the IMF and the President of the 
World Bank to resolve the debt problems of a group of countries called the Heavily Indebted 
Poor Countries (HIPCs).
41 The initiative aimed to commit the official international 
community to reduce to sustainable levels the debt service of countries that successfully 
completed a period of “strong policy performance” in regard to macroeconomic adjustment 
and structural and social policy. Aside from applying the deepest Paris Club relief yet on 
offer, the HIPC Initiative contemplated reducing the debt servicing obligations to IMF and the 
multilateral development banks, all of which had heretofore been regarded as senior creditors 
whose obligations had to be serviced no matter at what cost.
42 
The Initiative was meant to ensure that a country’s debt burden would not in future inhibit its 
capacity for sustained growth. The methodology chosen by the World Bank and the IMF in 
order to assess the sustainability of a country’s debt involved making projections of 
macroeconomic variables and capital flows over a given time horizon, focusing on the 
implied evolution of two external debt indicators, debt to exports and debt service to exports. 
Initially, the upper limits for sustainability ranged from 20–25 per cent for the debt-service-to-
exports ratio and 200–250 per cent for the ratio of PV of debt to exports. That is, debt relief 
for a country was meant to bring its ratios down to these ranges. 
However, for some countries the fiscal burden of external debt service appeared more binding 
than the balance-of-payments constraint. The Boards of the World Bank and the IMF thus 
agreed in April 1997 to broaden eligibility to the HIPC Initiative (on a case-by-case basis) to 
countries that did not have such a severe debt burden relative to exports if they had a 
particularly severe fiscal burden indicator. From that point on, a PV of debt-to-exports ratio 
below 200 per cent would not disqualify a country provided that the country met two 
additional criteria: an export-to-GDP ratio of at least 40 per cent and a minimum ratio of 
fiscal revenue to GDP of at least 20 per cent. The target for relief in these cases would be to 
bring the ratio of the PV of debt to fiscal revenue down to 280 per cent. 
While arguments could, and later would, be made about the analytical limitations of the 
threshold indicators, the difficulties that first rose were not about the choice or the 
interpretation of the indicators, but rather on the complexity of the calculations of the PV and 
estimations of exports involved. Uganda was the first country to come through the system: 
During the months leading up to the presentation of the final HIPC document for Uganda 
at the Boards of the Fund and the Bank, we were engaged in a series of intense 
 
                                                 
41 Eligibility for the HIPC Initiative was limited to countries eligible to borrow from the World Bank’s 
concessional facility, the International Development Association, and that faced an unsustainable debt 
situation. The preliminary classification of HIPCs included four categories of countries with regard to 
debt sustainability. For the details see Boote and Thugge (1997). 
42 In fact, the institutions would still be repaid, if not by the debtors, as creditor governments covered 
the forgone debt servicing inflows of the relief-giving multilateral institutions (albeit with certain 
exceptions, principally, use of proceeds from revaluation of some of the IMF’s gold and some of the 
profits of World Bank loans to middle-income countries).   19
discussions with the staff from the IMF and the World Bank, not over which indicators 
should be employed in the analysis of our debt sustainability, as this is largely a matter 
outside our control, but over how these apparently ‘simple’ indicators should be 
calculated…For example, there are different methods by which PV can be 
measured…we argued very strongly for the need to do some kind of averaging of exports 
figures in order to produce a realistic picture. The question then arises as to how this 
averaging is done, and again, the differences in cash terms are potentially very great.
43  
By 1999, it was already clear that after all the calculations were made and resources 
committed according to those calculations, the amount of relief was still deeply inadequate. 
The World Bank and the IMF, under mounting pressure from the growing Jubilee Movement 
and facts on the ground, saw the need to undertake a full review of the HIPC Initiative. The 
external resource flows and debt reduction under the targets that were defined in the original 
framework seemed to fall short for low-income countries to achieve debt sustainability, owing 
both to how the Initiative was being applied and the principles governing it.
44 The review led 
to the so-called Enhanced HIPC Initiative. The innovations in the Enhanced HIPC Initiative 
started with lowering the debt-indicator thresholds to qualify for relief and to serve as targeted 
end points of relief. The consequence was that more countries might become eligible for the 
Initiative and those previously eligible might be able to seek larger debt relief. 
In addition to agreeing to deepen relief, the major innovation of the Enhanced HIPC Initiative 
was that it sought to link debt relief to poverty reduction in an explicit way. However, the 
criteria governing the amount of debt relief did not pertain to poverty alleviation. The debt-
relief target still aimed to remove the so-called “debt overhang” in order to reduce fiscal and 
payments constraints on domestic policy and allow countries to attain significant economic 
growth. These factors ought to result in a poverty reduction effect in the medium or long term, 
assuming the objectives of debt rescheduling are first achieved. The new connection that the 
Enhanced HIPC Initiative made to poverty alleviation was rather to require that resources 
freed up by debt relief should instead be applied to “pro-poor” government expenditures. In 
addition, HIPCs were now required to develop overall poverty reduction strategies, taking 
account of the views of non-governmental stakeholders. 
One reason for keeping the amount of debt relief in the HIPC Initiative focused on 
eliminating the “debt overhang” was concerned that investors and other private agents might 
not be willing to invest for fear that their profits would be taxed away in order to pay for 
foreign debt. However, if the Initiative does not relieve fiscal pressure but transfers it from 
debt servicing to human and social investment expenditures, the effect will be similar to that 
of a debt overhang, generating a “poverty alleviation overhang”. It is important to understand 
 
                                                 
43 Rutakamagra (1997: 4–5). 
44 The debtor’s perspective is given by Comboni (2000): “An issue that appears time and again in all 
DSAs [debt sustainability analyses] done with the participation of IMF staff is that macroeconomic 
assumptions tend to be overtly optimistic. The cases of Uganda and Bolivia are examples of that. To 
project that exports will grow by a two digit figure, while in reality they fall, seems to be a pervasive bias 
that needs to be corrected. The objective should be to perform a professional work aimed to help the 
country solve some of its most pressing problems, instead of trying to show that the country will be 
sustainable no matter what”, p 33. “It was clear right from the onset, that the original HIPC initiative was 
not able to reduce the degree of indebtedness to a level of sustainability. In the first two countries to 
receive HIPC relief, debt sustainability analysis done right after completion point showed that neither 
country attained the HIPC I defined level of sustainability. For the case of Bolivia, the first completion 
point should have delivered a PV of debt to exports ratio of 225 per cent. Ex post analysis done for 1998 – 
the completion period year – shows that Bolivia had a level of sustainability of 232 per cent as measured 
by the above-mentioned indicator. This level is not very different from the pre-HIPC level of 252 per cent 
that the country showed on the official DSA done during 1997”, p 8.   20 
that the investment decisions of the private sector will indeed depend on issues such as 
profitability and the level of taxation, but what the taxes might be used for will not be crucial. 
More precisely, consider the individual HIPC’s obligations when it exits the programme and 
obtains its full relief. Assuming it needs the full Paris Club relief for HIPCs to reach its 
sustainability threshold, the debtor country obtains 90 per cent “external debt reduction” on its 
bilateral official debt. This means it must resume payments on the remaining 10 per cent of 
bilateral foreign debt that is not forgiven, and continue paying its remaining multilateral debt 
servicing. But the HIPCs are not freed from paying the forgiven 90 per cent: they instead re-
allocate it to social and human development expenditures in domestic currency. This is, in 
effect, a “debt for poverty alleviation swap”; in consequence, the Enhanced HIPC Initiative is 
actually a swap mechanism to convert foreign currency liabilities into domestic liabilities 
linked to poverty alleviation
45. 
There is a parallel swap on the creditor side, as debt relief is not absorbed but financed from 
the budget, indeed from the creditor’s aid budget. An important reason for official creditors to 
want to swap out of the foreign loan repayment obligations of their poorest debtors is that by 
any realistic assessment, the “value” of the debt had substantially fallen due to the 
deterioration of the debtor’s financial situation; i.e. the actual present value of the expected 
flow of debt servicing was less than the face value and reducing the stock of debt is the most 
realistic solution. This notwithstanding, when the debt is partially cancelled the accounting 
procedures in the creditor governments require that reduction in the value of the asset 
concerned be balanced by an offsetting item. That item is a transfer from the budget, in order 
to avoid recording a loss. The budget transfer, in these cases, is typically earmarked as 
“official development assistance” (ODA) or is effectively coming from the ODA budget. This 
is why creditor countries insist on counting debt relief as ODA. It is worthwhile to note that 
this mechanism absorbs ODA that could otherwise have been used for a real transfer of 
resources to HIPCs. It is also arbitrary to charge the ODA budget for the relief, as it mostly 
represents a failure of quasi-commercial lending policy. 
The accounting is not better – but more drawn out – when Paris Club creditors give their 
relief in reduced annual flows instead of a reduction in the stock of debt; i.e. when the 
contractual value of the claims remain unchanged, but the rate of interest and annual principal 
repayments are substantially curtailed, as some creditor countries chose to do, the profitability 
of the official export credit insurance agency would be impaired in the absence of offsetting 
revenues. In order to implement a debt reduction, in this case, the missing revenue has to be 
allocated from the budget as well. ODA, once again, is used to make up the lost revenue with 
the equivalent effect on the deprivation of ODA for a real transfer of resources to HIPCs. 
 
                                                 
45 Not all creditor countries are allowed by their domestic budget laws to provide a straight reduction 
on the stock of debt. The Paris Club, in order to overcome this problem, has calculated the equivalent 
flow reduction in PV to the stock reduction, so that these countries would provide debt relief with an 
equivalent burden sharing as the one by those countries granting the stock reduction. As far as creditors 
are concerned, so far so good! But on the debtor’s side, if the stock reduction is granted, the resources 
are more predictable than for the flow reduction. In the former case, 10 per cent of the original loan has 
to be honoured as originally scheduled in foreign currency, and 90 per cent is converted into domestic 
currency anti-poverty expenditure following the original schedule too (here with an exchange rate risk 
borne by the debtor, because the amount of expenditure required is converted into domestic currency at 
the date the payment would otherwise fall due). However, if the option the creditor took is flow 
reduction, there is less predictability for the debtor because of an option given the creditor. It is allowed 
to alter the annual flow of debt servicing it wishes to receive in any year or years based on its own 
treasury needs as long as compensating changes are made in other years so as not to change the PV 
equivalence of the entire flow. This leaves the debtor no assured means to forecast the amount to be 
paid in foreign currency, let alone the amount to be expended for anti-poverty programmes in domestic 
currency in any given year.   21
In both cases, stock or flow reduction, donor resources are being utilized to cover the budget 
or the export agencies’ losses originated by the loss of worth of the HIPC’s debt, and the 
resources so allocated are earmarked ODA. Here, there is an astonishing paradox as far as the 
Enhanced HIPC Initiative is concerned: ODA is used, at least partially, to cover the creditor 
countries export credit agencies’ losses, and then the pressure for poverty alleviation 
expenditures is put on the poor countries’ domestic budget through the debt swap for poverty 
alleviation mechanism described above. 
Moreover, while the intention in the Enhanced HIPC Initiative to bring about additional pro-
poor expenditure may be appreciated, the resources required to implement poverty reduction 
are huge relative to poor country budgets. They also require expenditures over a long time 
span to have the desired effect. At this point, a very legitimate question arises: if HIPCs have 
been unable to generate resources to repay their debt, how can they manage the huge 
expenditures that poverty reduction requires? Moreover, additional social expenditures are 
only part of the solution. Even if practical problems of reaching the poor through social 
spending are overcome, long-term poverty reduction depends on the expansion of 
employment, productivity and economic growth. Channelling a relatively small amount of 
debt relief into social spending is a very incomplete step to long-term poverty reduction. 
The creditors and donor countries should accept, as they do in principle if not necessarily in 
practice, that debt relief is not enough for a successful long-term poverty reduction policy. It 
will be necessary for creditors to continue to provide capital flows on concessional terms to 
HIPCs, to provide HIPCs’ exports access to domestic markets without trade barriers, and to 
provide incentives to the private sector for investing in HIPCs. The HIPC Initiative requires, 
in other words, not only a coordinated official bilateral and multilateral creditor effort vis-à-
vis the external debt of the poor countries, but coordination by essentially the same players 
over other financial and trade policies as well.
46 
VII. ANOTHER CURRENT FOCUS: EVIAN AND  
“COMPARABLE TREATMENT” 
An issue that became especially salient in the late 1990s is the “comparability” of treatment 
that official creditors asked the debtor government to obtain from its private sector lenders. 
The demand for comparable treatment followed from the same logic as the Paris Club itself, 
namely that creditors with comparable standing should share the burden of restructuring in a 
comparable way. However, comparable does not mean equal. While the seniority of loans of 
the IMF and the development banks was universally accepted, the Paris Club and non-Paris 
Club bilateral official lenders were seen as on a similar footing. This was a longstanding 
principle, although neither the debtor nor the Club members could do more than urge non-
Club official lenders to cooperate. By the time of the 1980s debt restructurings, many 
countries had significant private as well as Paris Club debt. The IMF would guide the debtor 
countries to settle their rescheduling with the Paris Club and to settle with the “steering 
 
                                                 
46 The 1953 Agreement for Germany is an example of the importance of trade development between 
creditors and debtors for success is “exiting” from cyclical rescheduling exercises. See Hersel (2002).   22 
committees” of creditor banks, called London Clubs.
47 Although there were several rounds of 
short-term treatment by both Paris and London Clubs in the 1980s crises, it was clear that the 
banks would bear more of the remaining burden than the official creditors. 
By the next cycle of debt crises in the late 1990s, most private loans to developing countries 
were bond issues, with potentially many thousands of bondholders and no coordinating 
mechanism of bondholders for negotiating restructurings that operated like London Clubs. 
Also, in the 1980s, the small number of developing country bond issues generally continued 
to be serviced even when bank loans were not. This would have to change. In 1999, Ecuador, 
Pakistan and Ukraine were facing bond-rescheduling problems. Governments in the Paris 
Club raised the question of burden-sharing comparability between private and official 
creditors. Very large-scale official bailout operations for some middle-income countries in the 
1990s were being criticized by the end of the decade for risking public money to bail out 
private creditors (although all the loans were fully repaid). Suggestions were made that public 
assistance, including debt rescheduling, should not be provided unless some relief was also 
obtained from private creditors. 
Pakistan had significant principal amounts falling due under its Eurobonds in December 1999. 
The Paris Club made it clear that Pakistan would need to implement comparable treatment 
between official and private creditors, in particular bondholders, if Pakistan wished to also 
have its bilateral debt rescheduled. Official creditors would not provide a bailout unless 
bondholders were “bailed in”. Subsequently, Pakistan negotiated to exchange the existing 
Eurobonds at par for 10 perc ent bonds due in 2002/2005, which was accepted by more than 
90 per cent of bondholders. This was, in essence, a concerted refinancing of the Pakistani 
bonds. 
Ecuador also required debt restructuring in 1999, although it came about differently. It 
became the first country to default on “Brady Bonds”, the financial instrument into which the 
Brady Plan had finally transformed the reduced value of defaulted bank debt from the 1980s 
debt crisis. Ecuador asked the bondholders to draw upon the interest collateral provided under 
the Brady Plan to pay-off the interest payment default. Bondholders reacted adversely by 
voting to “accelerate” the bonds (demand repayment in full immediately, which was provided 
for in the bond contracts), thereby opening the doors to litigation. In so doing, bondholders 
created a “cross default” event affecting all of Ecuador’s other bonds. In essence, as all the 
bonds had equivalent seniority for repayment, payments could not be made to one bond 
without also addressing the others. 
Ecuador finally resolved its problem in August 2000 by swapping old bonds for new ones at 
about a 40 per cent discount from original face value. It is important to note that the private 
creditors felt that the government of Ecuador had forced an excessive “haircut” on them with 
the backing of IMF. In this case, the private sector settled first and then the Paris Club 
rescheduled Ecuador’s official debt, first in September 2000 and then again in June 2003. 
 
                                                 
47 The major banks created “steering committees”, which represented the largest creditor banks in order 
to negotiate with the debtor countries. Once a tentative agreement was reached between the steering 
committee and the debtor country, the banks represented by the committee had to ratify the agreement, 
which sometimes required a lot of pressure, sometimes even using the Central Banks of the creditor 
countries, in order to obtain what was called, “a critical mass” of creditors necessary for implementing 
the agreement. It is important to make some remarks about the “steering committees”. First, even 
though they are regularly referred to as the “London Club”, these committees do not necessarily meet 
in London. Second, the composition of the committee can be extremely different from one debtor 
country to another. Last but not least, the London Club does not have general guidelines or features like 
the Paris Club does, so their behaviour is really ad hoc including its composition, the distribution of the 
debt among the creditors and the debtor country’s particularities.   23
Final Paris Club treatment for Ecuador in this crisis, under the Houston Terms, rescheduled 
non-ODA credits over 18 years, including 3 years of grace, followed by progressively higher 
repayments until maturity, at the appropriate market interest rate; ODA credits were to be 
repaid over 20 years, including 10 years of grace, at a rate at least as favourable as the 
concessional rates applying to those loans. Amounts paid included notably post-cut-off date 
maturities and flows on the previous Paris Club agreement concluded in September 2000 as 
well as moratorium interest.
48 However, there was no debt reduction on the non-ODA debt 
and thus no comparability with the bondholders. 
While the bondholders would deem this unfair, a more telling concern was the reason, namely 
that the forums and processes for dealing with different lenders to a country with a debt crisis 
operate independently of each other. Not only was there no assurance of inter-creditor equity, 
but it was not clear that the various separate processes would result in an appropriate overall 
amount of relief. Moreover, there was also concern that a minority of bondholders could 
prevent the now-standard way to restructure bonds – a swap of old bonds for new ones on 
easier terms – from taking place through actions in the courts of the countries in which the 
bonds were issued, usually New York or London. The lack of clearly established “rules of the 
game” for resolving crises in international lending as they apply to sovereign borrowers, in 
particular the absence of a process analogous to a bankruptcy court for sovereign nations, 
created many different proposals and much research. 
It seems that three main schools of thought have emerged for how to address these concerns. 
The first one is very “market mechanism oriented” and claims that markets themselves will 
solve this problem if multilateral institutions do not bail out insolvent borrowers and 
imprudent lenders. This author’s view is that this approach has proven its inefficiency in 
practically all situations. The second one states that either the IMF or the G-7 central banks 
should act as last resort lenders; i.e. if central banks lend at a penalty interest rate with good 
collateral, debtor countries will find a way out.
49 The third one calls for a formal, mandatory 
process of debt restructuring similar to a domestic bankruptcy court, i.e. a Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM). According to this last mechanism, courts would enforce a 
temporary “standstill” on creditor claims for repayment while a restructuring was being 
worked out and a suitably defined majority of creditors would impose a debt-restructuring 
scheme on all other creditors. 
The IMF’s proposal by Anne O. Kruger was to create an SDRM, which in its original 
formulation could have provided a means to bring together private and bilateral official 
creditors and provide a forum for obtaining “comparable” treatment as well as ensure that the 
total amount of relief was sufficient. However, major developed countries declined to 
participate as one of the creditor classes to be covered by an SDRM, and the private financial 
sector and the bond-issuing countries opposed the proposal. It was turned down in April 2003 
during the IMF-World Bank Spring meeting. 
Instead of a comprehensive mechanism with IMF at its centre, the Paris Club was pushed to 
take on a more central role. As a follow-up, in May 2003 during the meeting of the Ministers 
of Finance of the G-7 in Deauville, France, a new Paris Club approach for non-HIPCs was 
announced. In June 2003, at the heads of State Meeting of the Group of 8 in Evian, France, 
this new approach was welcomed and in October 2003, the Paris Club creditor countries 
reached an agreement on how to implement the new approach. Actually, the only piece of the 
 
                                                 
48 In fact, Ecuador tried to settle first the bilateral debt by attending a Paris Club Meeting on 18 and 19 
May 2000, but the creditors’ demands, as the Brady bonds question was unsettled, were so hard for 
Ecuador to accept that there was no agreement. The author attended this unsuccessful Paris Club 
meeting on behalf of UNCTAD. 
49 See UNCTAD (1990: 27) and Foncerrada (2001: 81–86).   24 
external debt rescheduling rules that the Paris Club was missing was precisely how to deal 
with non-HIPCs. This was to officially give a name to the Paris Club long-stand of giving ad-
hoc case-by-case terms to specific LICs and middle-income countries. This event was, in 
some extent, not necessarily intended to replace an SDRM, however, the refusal of a large 
international financial community to support it and the now “comprehensive” rules of the 
game for the Paris Club made that, at least for the moment, no further intent to implement an 
SDRM was pursued. 
The foundation for the “Evian Approach” is that the lack of comprehensive treatment of all 
categories of debt creates difficulties for debt sustainability achievement, making the debtor 
country come back to the Paris Club, as well as other creditors, in a cyclical manner. In this 
context, the Paris Club creditor countries decided to apply differentiated terms to restructuring 
their own credits and to press hard for comparable treatment by the other creditors, which if 
given would meet the debtor’s overall need for relief (at least as interpreted by the Paris 
Club). The Paris Club would be relying on the debt sustainability assessment carried out by 
the IMF, but reach its own conclusions. Here, the Paris Club would differentiate between a 
“liquidity” problem and an “unsustainable” debt problem, adapting the terms of its 
rescheduling to the financial situation of the debtor country. 
A “liquidity problem” would continue to be treated with the standard terms. Thus, if the 
country is an “IDA country”, i.e. is eligible to borrow from the World Bank’s concessional 
window, the International Development Association, it will receive the Naples terms tailored 
to its financial situation. In the case where the debtor country is not an IDA country, it would 
get either the Houston terms or the Classic terms. In the Paris Club’s view, however, at times, 
the Houston terms appeared to be too generous for the debtor country needs, and thus a more 
detailed ad hoc consideration for different debtor country cases was needed. In other words, 
the Houston terms would be applied with more heterogeneity. 
The Paris Club would apply different relief modalities if there is a finding of a “sustainability 
problem” and if the country is engaged with the IMF in an economic adjustment programme 
and is committed to policies that will secure its permanent exit from the Paris Club 
rescheduling cycle. In this case, there would be no “standard terms” and debt relief would be 
given in three stages. The debt relief could take various forms, include different flexible 
instruments, and push forward the cut-off date (i.e. make more recent and previously excluded 
loans subject to restructuring). Country programmes would be considered on case-by-case 
basis. The following table tries to summarize the Evian Approach. 
EVIAN APPROACH FOR NON-HIPCs 
  Liquidity problem  Unsustainable problem 
Non-IDA 
country 
Classic Terms or ad hoc 
Houston Terms 
IDA country  Naples Terms tailored to the 
country’s financial situation 
No Standard Terms: on a 
case-by-case basis, the debt 
relief would be given in three 
stages 
The process envisaged for applying the Evian approach begins with the IMF carrying out an 
assessment of the sustainability of the debt in the debtor country, which is in fact an official 
recognition of a long stand practice. If the debt were considered unsustainable, then the debtor 
country would commit to an IMF Adjustment Programme that aimed, in cooperation with the 
Paris Club, to become sustainable and thus avoid the need for a post-Evian return to the Paris 
Club. Then, the first stage of the Evian approach would be implemented with the Paris Club 
providing debt relief on one to three years of debt service flows. This debt relief flow would 
have to be comprehensive and include all types of creditors’ claims, including Paris Club and 
non-Paris Club. This first stage would be followed by an exit treatment over two stages,   25
which are not as of yet well defined. The exit treatment might include reduction of the debt 
stock on an exceptional basis. 
The first country treated under the Evian Approach was Kenya on 15 January 2004. Two 
outstanding points resulted from this experience: the debt was considered sustainable and the 
country was given Naples Terms without debt reduction. The payments due over three years 
were treated, with a decreasing percentage of amounts due consolidated each year: 82 per cent 
in 2004, 77 per cent in 2005 and 67 per cent in 2006, which was not generous for a country 
like Kenya. The Agreed Minute included a specific trigger clause that made the full 
implementation of the agreement contingent upon comparability of treatment that would be 
assessed regularly. 
Iraq, under very special circumstances, attended a Paris Club meeting from 17–21 November 
2004 under the Evian Approach. Iraq obtained a comprehensive debt treatment of its public 
external debt owed to the Paris Club creditor countries, which would reduce its debt by 80 per 
cent in three phases. First, part of the late interest payments, representing 30 per cent of the 
debt stock as at 1 January 2005, was immediately cancelled. Second, payment on the 
remaining debt stock was deferred up to the date of the approval of a standard IMF 
programme, which occurred on 23 December 2005. At that point, a reduction of 30 per cent 
of the debt stock was to be delivered. The remaining debt stock would be rescheduled over a 
period of 23 years including a 6-year grace period. This step would raise the rate of 
cancellation to 60 per cent. Third, the Paris Club agreed to grant an additional tranche of debt 
reduction representing 20 per cent of the initial stock upon successful completion of the last 
IMF Board review of three-years of implementation of Iraq’s IMF programme. This debt 
reduction would bring the total debt stock from US$38.9 billion to US$7.8 billion, which is 
the 80 per cent reduction final goal. On a voluntary basis, each creditor country may also 
undertake debt swaps. A clause calling on Iraq to obtain comparable treatment from other 
external creditors was included in the agreement. 
In 2005, Nigeria was declared eligible for “IDA-only” borrowing status, and subsequently 
attended the Paris Club from 18–20 October 2005. In lieu of negotiating a policy programme 
in the context of taking a loan from IMF under a Standby Arrangement (the usual prerequisite 
for a Paris Club deal), Nigeria issued a “policy support instrument” (PSI), which was 
approved by the board of the IMF. Nigeria then paid all its arrears owed to Paris Club 
creditors, received a measure of debt write down, and bought back much of its debt at a 
discount. On this basis, this debt treatment included debt reduction up to Naples terms on 
eligible debts and a buy back at a market-related discount on the remaining eligible debts after 
reduction. This agreement would be implemented in two phases in consonance with the 
implementation of the PSI. First, Nigeria undertook to pay arrears due on all categories of 
debts and Paris Club creditors granted a 33 per cent cancellation of eligible debts. Second, 
after the first review of the PSI by the Executive Board of the IMF in March 2006, the 
Nigerian Government paid amounts due on post-cut off date debt. Paris Club creditors then 
granted a further tranche of cancellation of 34 per cent on eligible debts, and Nigeria bought 
back the remaining eligible debts. In total, Nigeria obtained a debt cancellation estimated at 
US$18 billion, including moratorium interest, representing an overall cancellation of about 60 
per cent of its debt to the Paris Club, which was around US$30 billion. Paris Club creditors 
requested to be paid an amount of US$12.4 billion, representing regularization of arrears of 
US$6.3 billion plus a balance of US$6.1 billion to complete the exit strategy. The Paris Club 
creditors stated that this exceptional treatment of Nigeria’s debt intended to provide a 
definitive solution to the problem of Nigeria’s debt owed to them. 
In neither the Nigerian nor Iraqi cases does the Paris Club report that it has applied its Evian 
Approach. These would rather seem to qualify as politically important cases, treated in ad hoc 
ways, as has been the Paris Club practice since the treatment of Turkey and Indonesia almost 
half a century ago. As of October 2007, only one country has been listed on the Paris Club   26 
web site as having been accorded a comprehensive treatment under the Evian Approach, and 
this is the Kyrgyz Republic in March 2005. In at least two cases, Grenada in May 2006 and 
Georgia in 2004, the “good will” clause of the Paris Club agreement stipulates that the Club 
might address the country’s debt in future under the Evian Approach. Certainly, there is no 
evidence that the Evian Approach has guided negotiations of any major debtor country with 
its private creditors, especially its bondholders.
50 In sum, the Evian Approach has not solved 
the problem of developing an international mechanism for a comprehensive and equitable 
approach to resolving sovereign debt problems. It would thus be desirable to continue giving 
a further thought to how to deal with sovereign debt problems in a transparent, orderly, 
coordinated and timely manner. 
VIII. CONCLUSION: A SELECTION OF OUTSTANDING POLICY ISSUES 
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss alternative comprehensive debt workout 
mechanisms, the experience of the Paris Club as reviewed here points to a minimal list of 
reforms that member countries of the Paris Club might themselves consider. 
1. “Reverse comparability” 
The major thrust of international policy regarding sovereign debt today is that governments 
need to pay close attention to achieving and maintaining “sustainability”. The Evian approach 
to debt workouts aims to put this policy thrust into practice through its effort to be 
comprehensive and bring about “comparability of treatment” of claims held by other 
government creditors and the private sector. However, the treatment of debt problems by the 
private sector has been, at least in some cases, more pragmatic and longer lasting than the 
Paris Club’s “short-leash” rescheduling. For example, the market-based private sector 
restructuring in Ecuador following its default included a write-down of debt, while the Paris 
Club’s restructuring shortly thereafter did not. Write-downs were also part of the private-
sector workouts following the Argentine and Russian defaults, although they were not part of 
any of the other private sector ‘market-based swaps’ in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The 
Paris Club might thus consider applying, within the Evian framework, a “reverse 
comparability” in the sense that it considers from the start, in addition to flows, an approach 
to debt problems that directly addresses the stock of official debt, as private creditors do for 
bonds and bank loans.
51 
The Paris Club justifies addressing the flows and not the stocks even when the bilateral 
official debt is the largest share of the debtor’s outstanding debt and private creditors are 
pulling out, reducing their exposure. Moreover, in the cases in which bonds are the largest 
component of a debtor country’s external debt, uncertainty about the final Paris Club 
disposition has become an obstacle to reaching a swift solution. There are only two currently 
 
                                                 
50 In its report on meeting with representatives of the international private financial sector on 9 June 
2004, the Paris Club Secretariat noted, “Paris Club creditors presented their views on the treatment of 
Argentina’s debt under the Evian Approach while private creditors reported on the status of their 
relations with Argentina. This debate enabled both parties to better understand the positions of the 
different stakeholders involved in the process” (see Press release, 9 June 2004). Neither this nor 
subsequent events suggest any degree of coordination of bondholders and the Paris Club. 
51 See Rieffel (2003) for the private creditor point of view on the same issue. Rieffel suggests 
modifications to the Paris Club practices as necessary changes for the present arrangements on 
sovereign debt rescheduling to prevail, and thus avoid the need for a formal implementation of an 
SDRM. In this paper, these modifications are presented as a necessity in order for the Paris Club to be 
on the same footing as the private creditors, without precluding the implementation of an SDRM that 
could indeed involve the Paris Club and private creditors sitting in the same meeting.   27
available techniques for rescheduling bonds and neither one lends itself to the partial 
approaches embodied in the Paris Club flow rescheduling. The first is through a vote of 
bondholders, if the pertinent collective action clauses (CACs) are in place,
52 in order to extend 
the maturity and/or adjust the interest rate on a one-time only basis, and the second is to carry 
out a market exchange of old bonds for new bonds. 
The Paris Club has already accepted stock-of-debt reduction, both for the HIPCs and middle-
income countries (Poland, Egypt, the Russian Federation and Iraq). Yet, the strong 
presumption is against debt reduction in non-HIPC treatments of debt in the Paris Club for 
countries that are not politically sensitive cases for the creditors. If the Paris Club does not 
take broader steps toward debt reduction, an equity problem will emerge because the Paris 
Club creditors would be according themselves more favourable treatment than the private 
creditors.
53 
2. Rescheduling and “new money” 
In the early 1980s, commercial bank debt negotiations, the thrust was not to reduce the debt 
but to lend new funds in a concerted way to keep the debt servicing on old loans from 
becoming “non-performing”. From a cash-flow perspective, the Paris Club did the same thing 
with its rescheduling arrangements, in that repayments were in effect refinanced with new 
loans bearing commercial interest rates. There is thus a fundamental question when arranging 
a flow rescheduling: how much relief to accord as restructuring of debt servicing obligations 
and how much as new money. The private sector has addressed the debt problems in the past 
in a way that directly concerned debt stock reduction and committed new money in addition 
to debt relief. Aside from a signal of confidence for a country that new lending might give, 
the Paris Club would indeed benefit from a statement of intention for lending new-money in 
the Agreed Minute, without systematically leaving this matter to bilateral negotiations, and 
thus also bearing the new money burden sharing equitably, at least concerning official and 
officially insured export credits. 
In the 1960s, in Turkish case, some of the “relief” was provided as rescheduling and some as 
new loans. The forum, however, was not the Paris Club but an OECD Consortium. Indeed, 
Paris Club representatives would not have the authority to grant new lending. Accordingly, 
the possibility might be considered for the Paris Club to merge traditional Paris Club tasks 
with a kind of consultative group, which should include the development agencies, export 
credit institutions and private sector creditor representatives.
54 This would allow additional 
 
                                                 
52 In simple terms, CACs grant a qualified majority of bondholders the ability to change the terms of 
the issuance and bind the rest of the holders to the new terms. CACs come into play when an issuer 
decides, or is forced, to restructure its debt and the holders are faced with the alternative to consent to 
the restructuring or to seek to enforce the original terms. See Repetto, Buljevitch and Rodríguez-
Beltrán (2005) and Mathieson and Schinasi (2000) for more details on this matter. 
53 The Paris Club has actually applied in some extent “reverse comparability”: in April 1996, the Paris 
Club agreed to a comprehensive rescheduling of bilateral debt of the Russian Federation. Besides the 
substantial amount involved in this agreement (around US$40 billion), it was exceptional because it 
was a stock-of-debt rescheduling on non-concessional terms. The commercial banks had reached their 
own comprehensive agreement with Russia in November 1995 paving the way for the agreement with 
the Paris Club. 
54 Presently, and on a regular basis, the Paris Club organizes meetings with representatives of the 
private sector creditors that have been qualified as frank and constructive. These are not negotiation 
sessions on individual countries but rather a sharing of views on the state of debt workouts. See 
websites of the Paris Club (www.clubdeparis.org) and the Institute of International Finance 
(www.iif.com) for reports and materials from these meetings.   28 
external resource requirements for the debtor country to be seriously examined as a function 
of its overall debt relief and financing needs.
55 
3. Revive the “Bisque” clause 
Last but not least, this paper has shown that for the countries where debt relief was based on 
what the debtor country “could pay” and not what it “should pay”, long-term stable solutions 
for the debtor countries concerned were worked out, in the benefit of both debtor and creditor 
countries. In most of these cases, a bisque clause helped the debtor avoid lengthy and costly 
renegotiations arising from unforeseen external shocks. It would also be very important and 
legitimate to give a serious thought to the reintroduction, within specific circumstances, of a 
bisque clause within the Paris Club Agreed Minute. 
Note that the inclusion of a bisque clause within the Paris Club Agreed Minute would trigger 
the “equitable burden sharing” issue among different types of creditors. Thus, coordination 
would also be necessary in order to work out a rescheduling process on an equal footing for 
all creditors. In other words, the bisque clause should affect all creditors equally. 
The desirability of equitable comparable treatment of private and Paris Club debt when 
countries fall into crises calls for “lining up” the various rescheduling exercises. This means 
that if a bisque clause is included in the Paris Club Agreement, something similar, in terms 
and conditions, should be reflected, in one way or another, in treatments of private bond 
holders as well as non-Paris Club official creditors. 
Regarding official creditors, including the bisque clause in the present “comparability clause” 
in the Agreed Minute would be a good starting point. Regarding the private sector, in 
particular bond holders, the new issues would have to bear specific clauses that would line up 
with the conditions triggering the bisque clause in the Agreed Minute.
56 
The above discussion makes more necessary that during the rescheduling exercises, all kinds 
of creditors should be coordinated, as it was pointed out above: the possibility might be 
considered for the Paris Club to merge traditional Paris Club tasks with a kind of consultative 
group, which should include, inter alia, private sector creditors’ representatives, to allow 
additional external resources requirements for the debtor country to be seriously examined as 
a function of global debt relief and financing needs, including the possibility of including a 




                                                 
55 At the Paris Club, the link between rescheduling and new money is created by the fixing of the cut-
off date: the willingness of export credit agencies to grant new credits depends, critically, on the 
expectation that these credits will be serviced on a timely basis. Thus, a fixed cut-off date is essential 
for insurance coverage to remain affordable for the debtor country. In some cases in the past, in order 
to preserve the cut-off date, the Paris Club has provided more comprehensive rescheduling than 
otherwise would have been the case. However, the additional resources to be obtained under these 
circumstances had absolutely no link to the Paris Club debt relief criteria. The Paris Club includes the 
export credit institutions of the member countries, but without a direct role on new-lending 
commitments. 
56 For example, the restructured bond or loan could include a “put option”, under which the debtor 
would have the right to issue additional debt to existing creditors at existing or pre-specified terms in 
lieu of making one or more scheduled repayments.    29
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